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| Lema, Daniel. |
| This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We contend that in a context of modern agriculture, with well defined property rights, agricultural contracts must balance costs and benefits, aligning tenant and landlord incentives towards a similar objective. The study debates the potential effects of tenancy status and duration of contracts, over soil conservation and input use. We present empirical evidence about the effects over the soil and input use in tenant (fixed rent or sharecropping) and owner-operator farms using farm level data from the 2002 National Agricultural Census of Argentina. The empirical results show some differential effects but do not support a general and clear negative effect for... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Agriculture; Transaction Costs; Sharecropping; Property Rights; Land Tenancy; Production Economics; D2; Q15. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25420 |
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| Andersson, Camilla I.M.. |
| We model the economic incentives surrounding opium crop production in Afghanistan. Specifically, we examine the impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. The analysis suggests that when perfect credit markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to less land being allocated to opium poppy. However, when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, the effects of eradication are no longer clear-cut. Finally, under sharecropping arrangements, increased risk of eradication will make the tenants worse off, while landlords may benefit. |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Eradication; Informal credit markets; Opium; Sharecropping; Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty; Q12. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118959 |
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| Ndoye Niane, Aifa Fatimata; Burger, Kees; Bulte, Erwin H.. |
| In agriculture, the coexistence of different forms of land tenancy or labour contract has been explained so far by several theories related to Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, risk sharing, and transaction costs, including supervision costs. These theories and the empirical evidences have greatly contributed to explain the reasons behind land tenancy or labour contract choice. This study follows up on this. Moreover, it intends to take a further step by focusing particularly on the production technologies at plot level, and by designing and testing a theoretical model based on household profit optimization. This model will take into account the supervision costs of labour (i) to compare optimum profit derived from plots based on household labour, a... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Land tenancy; Labour; Sharecropping; Wage; Contract; Supervision; Household; Profit optimization; Efficient; Irrigation equipment; Horticulture; Senegal; Agricultural Finance. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95776 |
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| Hurrelmann, Annette. |
| Land markets have received a considerable amount of attention in economic literature. Since the treatment of the topic covers various approaches, areas, and questions, it seems desirable to attempt an overview of the results. This paper devises a way in which to present a complete picture of the land market by drawing together the various contributions. The first step is to establish a method by which a market in its entirety can be defined. It is suggested that the application of Oliver Williamson's "Four levels of social analysis" is an appropriate approach to be used in this endeavour. In the second step, the contributions to land market research are reviewed, according to Williamson's scheme, within four broad categories: (1) embeddedness, (2)... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: New Institutional Economics; Land Markets; Sharecropping; Land Reform; Land Titling; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24887 |
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| Pender, John L.; Fafchamps, Marcel. |
| This paper develops a theoretical model of land leasing that includes transaction costs of enforcing labor effort, risk pooling motives and non-tradable productive inputs. We test the implications of this model compared to those of the - Marshallian - (unenforceable labor effort) and "New School" (costlessly enforceable effort) perspectives using data collected from four villages in Ethiopia. We find that land lease markets operate relatively efficiently in the villages studied, supporting the New School perspective relative to the other two models. Land contract choice is found to depend upon the social relationships between landlords and tenants, but differences in contracts are not associated with significant differences in input use or output value per... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Land lease markets; Land tenure; Sharecropping; Agricultural efficiency; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/16045 |
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| de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth. |
| Temptation for tenants to under-report output levels under share contracts is undoubtedly high. There is evidence that theft of product occurs and that this affects the design of share contracts. In this case, the optimal output share is chosen to not only induce effort but also to reduce theft of product, while meeting the landlord's limited liability obligation. The tenant's share thus rises with his desire and ability to steal. The optimal contract allows both residual inefficiency in the provision of effort and residual cheating. This contract is also modified by process utility in cheating, ability of the landlord to supervise, risk of revenge with abusive surveillance, and switch to products less prone to theft. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Sharecropping; Cheating; Agrarian contract; Farm Management; Labor and Human Capital; D82; Q15; O17. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25119 |
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